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Measurement-device-independent (MDI) method is a way to solve all detector side-channel attacks
in quantum key distribution (QKD). However, very little work has been done on experimentally
feasible qudit-based MDI-QKD scheme although the famous (qudit-based) round-robin differential-
phase-shift (RRDPS) scheme is vulnerable to attacks on uncharacterized detectors. Here we report
a mother-of-all QKD protocol on which all provably secure qubit-based QKD schemes known to date
including the RRDPS and the so-called Chau15 schemes are based. We also report an experimentally
feasible MDI system via optical implementation of entanglement swapping based on a recent qudit
teleportation proposal by Goyal et al. In this way, we show that all provably secure qudit-based
QKD schemes discovered to date can be made MDI.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 89.70.-a
In quantum key distribution (QKD), two cooperative
agents (commonly called Alice and Bob) try to share
a secret key by sending and measuring signals through
a quantum channel. Realistic experimental apparatus,
which is never ideal, posts a serious and non-trivial
threat to the security of QKD as eavesdropper (com-
monly called Eve) may exploit loopholes due to appa-
ratus imperfections [1, 2]. Even worse, such loopholes,
some may yet to be found, could be experimental setup
specific. One way to solve the imperfect detector problem
is the so-called measurement-device-independent (MDI)
method [3], which uses teleportation or entanglement
swapping technique to close all detector side channel
loopholes once and for all. The beauty of MDI method is
that the teleportation or entanglement swapping mea-
surement can be performed by a third untrustworthy
party (commonly called Charlie). MDI method is ap-
plicable to all prepare-and-measure QKD schemes in-
volving the transfer of qubits, qudits and continuous-
variable quantum modes as long as these schemes can
be reduced from certain entanglement-based ones [3–5].
Several experiments have demonstrated the feasibility of
qubit-based MDI-QKD [6, 7]. However, it is not clear
how to reliably implement the qudit-based MDI proposal
in Ref. [4], which relies on the entanglement swapping
scheme by Bouda and Buzˇek [8], using photonics tech-
niques. With the discovery of several promising qudit-
based QKD schemes, study of their MDI version is no
longer a pure academic issue.
One such scheme is the round-robin differential-phase-
shift (RRDPS) scheme [9], which has attracted a few pi-
oneer experiments [10–13]. While this scheme is robust
against encoding errors [14] and does not need to mon-
itor signal disturbance [9], it is insecure against several
detector attacks [15, 16]. Moreover, it is not clear if the
MDI version of the RRDPS scheme exists.
Another scheme is the so-called Chau15 scheme [17].
Information is transmitted in this scheme and its exten-
sion [18] via preparation and measurement of qubit-like
qudits in the form (|j〉 ± |k〉)/√2 with |j〉 and |k〉 being
distinct orthonormal states in a 2n-dimensional Hilbert
space. Following Ref. [3], an naive MDI implementation
of these scheme is for Charlie to perform entanglement
swapping by measuring the states Alice and Bob send to
him along {|j, j′〉 ± |k, k′〉, |j, k′〉 ± |k, j′〉} for some ran-
domly chosen distinct pairs of (j, k) and (j′, k′). How-
ever, this naive implementation is insecure as the cheat-
ing Charlie may project the states Alice and Bob send to
him along |j′〉± |k′〉 and |j〉± |k〉 respectively before per-
forming the entanglement swapping to obtain the phase
information of the two states without being caught. Fur-
thermore, after entanglement swapping, Bob may have
to change the value of his raw key based on Charlie’s
measurement result [3]. This step can only be performed
without affecting the key rate if the teleportation proce-
dure is compatible with the state preparation procedure
of Alice and Bob in the sense that the quantum opera-
tions needed to transform between different teleportation
measurement states used (in the qubit case, these are the
four Pauli operations) can be deterministically mapped
to the corresponding classical operations acting on Bob’s
raw key (in the qubit case, this is the logical-NOT oper-
ation). Unfortunately, the teleportation procedure used
in Ref. [4] is not compatible with the state preparation
procedure used in the Chau15 scheme. Hence, even if one
may optically implement the MDI protocol in Ref. [4] in
future, it cannot be used make the Chau15 scheme MDI.
Here we first report a mother-of-all entanglement-
distillation-based MDI-QKD scheme which can be re-
duced to all known provably secure qudit-based QKD
schemes to date. Then we show the feasibility of this
mother-of-all scheme by reporting a linear optics imple-
2mentation of the required entanglement swapping oper-
ation.
The mother-of-all scheme.
1. Let n > 1, N ≡ 2n and GF (N) denotes the finite
field of N elements. Alice and Bob each prepare an
entangled state |Φ00〉 ≡
∑
i∈GF (N) |i, i〉/
√
N and
send the second half of the state to Charlie through
an insecure quantum channel.
2. Charlie performs entanglement swapping by
measuring the states he received from Alice
and Bob along the basis B = {|Φab〉 ≡∑
i∈GF (N)(−1)Tr(bi)|i, i + a〉/
√
N : a, b ∈ GF (N)},
where Tr(i) = i + i2 + i4 + · · · + iN/2 is the
absolute trace of i. Note that all arithmetic in
the state ket are done in the finite field GF (N).
(See Ref. [19] for an introduction to finite field
arithmetic.) Charlie publicly announces his mea-
surement result, namely, the values of a, b he ob-
tained. Bob applies the linear transformation |i〉 7→
(−1)Tr[(a−i)b]|i − a〉 for all i ∈ GF (N) to the first
half of his state. (Or equivalently, Alice applies the
linear transformation |i〉 7→ (−1)−Tr(ib)|i + a〉 to
the first half of her state.) In the absence of Eve
and noise, Alice and Bob should now share the en-
tangled state |Φ00〉.
3. Alice, Bob and Charlie repeat the above procedure
some times to accumulate enough entangled states.
Then Alice and Bob perform channel error estima-
tion, if necessary, plus entanglement distillation to
get the final almost perfect copies of |Φ00〉’s. They
measure their shares of these distilled pairs to get
their final key.
Note that if the state measurement procedure used by
Alice and Bob to obtain their final key in step 3 above
is compatible with the teleportation procedure in step 2,
we obtain a provably secure qudit-based QKD scheme by
the standard Shor-Preskill argument [20]. More impor-
tantly, all provably secure qudit-based QKD schemes to
date can be deduced from this mother-of-all scheme in
this way. For instance, if Alice and Bob both project
each of their shared distilled pairs to states in the form
(|j〉 ± |k〉)/√2, we get the Chau15 scheme [17] and its
extension [18]. If Alice and Bob project their states in
the form
∑
i∈GF (N)(−1)si |i〉/
√
N for si ∈ GF (2) and
[|j〉±|k〉]/√2 respectively, we obtain the RRDPS scheme
using N -dimensional qudits [9]. And if Alice and Bob
prepare their states using the method stated in Ref. [21],
we arrive at the so-called Chau05 scheme. We state the
MDI version of the RRDPS scheme obtained in this way
below as illustration.
The MDI version of the RRDPS scheme.
1. Alice prepares
∑
i∈GF (N)(−1)si |i〉/
√
N and sends
it to Charlie. She jots down the values of si’s.
2. Bob prepares [|j〉 + (−1)t|k〉]/√2 and sends it to
Charlie. He jots down the values of t ∈ GF (2) and
j 6= k ∈ GF (N). And he uses t as his raw bit.
3. Charlie jointly measures the states of Alice and Bob
along the basis B and announces the state |Φab〉 he
obtains.
4. Bob announces j and k.
5. Alice uses {sk−a−sj−a−Tr[b(k−j)]} mod 2 as her
raw bit.
6. Alice and Bob repeat the above steps to get suffi-
cient raw key bits and then distill out their final key
through error correction and privacy amplification.
Although it is not possible to perform the com-
plete Bell-like measurements in step 2 of the mother-
of-all scheme using linear optics [22, 23], we re-
port a partial implementation below based on Goyal
et al.’s qudit teleportation proposal. In Fig. 3 of
Ref. [24], Goyal et al. reported a way to project
a N qudit state to the antisymmetric state |Ψ〉 =
∑
P∈S(N) ε(P )
∏
i∈GF (N) a
†
i,P (i)|Ω〉/
√
N ! by means of lin-
ear optics and photon number resolving detectors. Here
S(N) is the group of permutations of a set of N elements,
ε(P ) is the sign of the permutation P , a†i,j is the creation
operator for a photon propagating along path i and or-
bital angular momentum j, and |Ω〉 is the vacuum state.
Since
∑
P∈S(N) ε(P )〈m|U−1|P (j)〉〈m|U−1|P (k)〉 = 0 for
all N -dimensional unitary operator U and j, k,m ∈
GF (N) with j 6= k, measuring every qudit of the state
|Ψ〉 along the basis {U |i〉 : i ∈ GF (N)} always yields N
distinct outcomes. In this sense, |Ψ〉 is the generaliza-
tion of the singlet state for qubits. By choosing U to be
a direct sum of N/2 Hadamard transformations, we have
the following modified MDI-RRDPS scheme using linear
optics. (Only those modified steps are shown.)
The MDI version of the RRDPS scheme using
linear optics.
2’ Bob randomly group theN elements in GF (N) into
N/2 pairs in the form {(ji, ki)}. He prepares (N −
1) distinct qudit states each selected from the basis
B¯ = {(|ji〉 ± |ki〉)/
√
2} and sends them to Charlie.
He jots down the state [|j〉+(−1)t|k〉]/√2 in B¯ that
he has not prepared and uses t as his raw bit.
3’ Charlie jointly projects the single qudit from Alice
and (N − 1) qudits from Bob to |Ψ〉 and informs
Alice and Bob if the projection is successful.
5’ Alice uses (sj − sk) mod 2 as her raw bit.
3Note that the connections between the above two MDI-
RRDPS schemes is that the |Ψ〉 used in the latter can be
identified with the |Φ0j〉 of the former for some j 6= 0
through the logical encoding of each state in the basis
set B¯ by the tensor product of the other N − 1 states
in B¯. Since the probability for Charlie to successfully
obtain |Ψ〉 in step 3’ equals 1/N2, the above scheme is
practical only when N is small. It is instructive to find
more efficient way to project a state to |Φij〉. Finally, we
write down the MDI version of the Chau15 scheme for
completeness.
The MDI version of the Chau15 scheme using lin-
ear optics.
Alice, Bob and Charlie follow all the steps in the
MDI version of the RRDPS scheme using linear op-
tics with the following modifications.
1” Alice sends the state [|j′〉+(−1)s|k′〉]/√2 to Char-
lie. She jots down j′ 6= k′ ∈ GF (N) and s ∈ GF (2).
5” If {j, k} = {j′, k′}, Alice and Bob uses s and t as
their raw key bits, respectively.
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